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The shades of German anti-Semitism
Kamil Frymark
The streets of Germany’s biggest cities are increasingly witnessing frequent anti-Semitic inci-
dents. Despite the fact that Germany regards the fight against anti-Semitism as part and parcel 
of its domestic policy, in recent years Jews living in Germany have reported that they feel under 
threat, to such an extent that 44% of them are considering migration. Debates on the presence 
of ‘imported anti-Semitism’ among refugees from Arab states who have come to Germany in 
recent years have been held for several months. Anti-Semitism among asylum seekers is a new 
element in the dispute that has been evident in Germany over the attitude of specific parties to 
anti-Semitism and methods for combating it. Both Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Left 
Party are accused by other parties of insufficient efforts to eliminate instances of anti-Semitism 
in their ranks. The AfD, for its part, accuses Chancellor Angela Merkel of having contributed to 
an increase in xenophobic tendencies by pursuing a liberal migration policy. 
Significant differences between the statistics concerning incidents (which suggest that the per-
petrators are most often right-wing extremists) and the accounts given by the victims (who 
point to individuals of migrant origin as the perpetrators) have triggered doubts regarding the 
methodology used to compile these statistics. Attempts by the Federal Ministry of the Interior 
to monitor anti-Semitic incidents, which is a practice recommended by non-governmental or-
ganisations, may help to improve the credibility of the statistics by showing the motivation be-
hind such attacks in a broader context. Activities carried out by the federation and by individual 
German states focus on curbing anti-Semitism on the internet and in schools, which is where 
incidents involving discrimination and attacks are becoming increasingly common. 
The Jewish diaspora in Germany
After world war II, the fight against anti-Sem-
itism became an important element of state 
doctrine and German-Israeli relations gained 
a special status. 1965 marked the onset of offi-
cial diplomatic relations and in June 1973 Willy 
Brandt paid a visit to Israel as the first German 
chancellor. Two years later, Israeli prime minis-
ter Yitzhak Rabin paid a return visit to Germany. 
The speech chancellor Angela Merkel delivered 
in the Knesset on the occasion of the 60th an-
niversary of the establishment of the state of 
Israel was one of the break-through moments. 
In her speech the chancellor presented the main 
direction of Germany’s foreign policy towards 
Israel: “Here of all places I want to explicit-
ly stress that every German Government and 
every German Chancellor before me has shoul-
dered Germany’s special historical responsibility 
for Israel’s security. This historical responsibility 
is part of my country’s raison d’être. For me as 
German Chancellor, therefore, Israel’s security 
will never be open to negotiation”1. 
1 ‘A speech by Federal Chancellor Dr Angela Merkel in 
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Israel is Germany’s most important partner in 
the Middle East in the fields of the economy, 
politics and security policy. This is manifested, 
for instance, in Germany granting Israel assis-
tance in its purchases of armaments, support-
ing it in the EU forums, and in assistance offered 
by the Bundeswehr – such as in 2006 when, 
at Israel’s explicit request, German troops were 
sent to the Middle East region to supervise the 
embargo on arms supply to Lebanon (the UNI-
FIL mission). Chancellor Merkel has visited Israel 
seven times, each time emphasising the special 
nature of German-Israeli relations. Germany 
holds regular intergovernmental consultations 
with Israel (which is one the few countries cov-
ered by this cooperation scheme) and decisions 
worked out during these events delineate the 
directions of bilateral cooperation. At the same 
time, Germany’s relations with Israel are not 
free from tension. For some time now, the gov-
ernment in Berlin has been opposed to Israeli 
settlement activity on land privately owned by 
Palestinians in the West Bank, because it sees it 
as a barrier to a durable resolution of the Israe-
li-Palestinian conflict, based on the principle of 
co-existence of the two states2.
At present, the population of Jews living in 
Germany is around 250,000, of which 100,000 
are members of Jewish communities. 108 
communities are grouped in 23 regional as-
sociations belonging to the Central Council of 
Jews in Germany. A decidedly smaller portion 
of the diaspora, which is organised in associ-
2 K. Frymark, ‘Napięcia pomiędzy Niemcami i Izraelem’, 
Analizy OSW, 10 May 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/
publikacje/analizy/2017-05-10/napiecia-pomiedzy-niem-
cami-i-izraelem
ations and communities, i.e. around 5%, be-
longs to around 40 Jewish cultural associations 
and the Union of Progressive Jews in Germany 
(Die Union progressiver Juden in Deutschland 
K.d.ö.R.)3, which is associated with Reform 
Judaism. The biggest Jewish communities are 
found in Berlin (around 11,000 members), Mu-
nich (8,000) and Düsseldorf (7,000). Large-scale 
immigration of Jews from former Soviet Union 
states to Germany has been of key importance 
for the expansion of the Jewish diaspora in Ger-
many following the country’s reunification. In 
1990–2017, 232,000 Jewish immigrants came 
to Germany (of the 250,000 Jewish people 
presently living there), many of whom joined 
Jewish communities4. Several new synagogues 
were built and a number of new regional Jew-
ish organisations were established. In 2003, an 
agreement was signed between the German 
state (represented by the Ministry of the Inte-
rior) and the Central Council of Jews, in which 
Germany committed itself to support the Jew-
ish population in Germany. A subsidy worth 
13 million euros annually intended to back the 
Council’s operations is a concrete demonstra-
tion of this support. In addition, federal state 
police protect designated buildings owned by 
Jewish communities, including synagogues, 
kindergartens and schools, cultural centres and 
selected restaurants. 
The growing sense of threat 
Recent years have seen a significant increase in 
the threat of anti-Semitic attacks as perceived 
by Jews living in Germany, with the recorded 
‘anxiety index’ being one the highest in the EU. 
This is evident from the study by the Institute 
for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and 
3 Der Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland, http://www.
bpb.de/politik /hintergrund-aktuell/209813/zentral-
rat-der-juden
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Violence at the University of Bielefeld (IKG), in 
which 78% of the respondents reported that 
over the last five years there has been an in-
crease in the degree of anti-Semitic behaviour 
in Germany. In a survey commissioned by the 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
(FRA), 41% of German Jews surveyed admitted 
that in 2018 they had fallen victim to some form 
of anti-Semitic attack (with the EU average be-
ing 28%). This indicates a considerable increase 
in comparison to the former FRA research con-
ducted in 2012, in which 29% of the surveyed 
individuals admitted to having been the target 
of attacks. Moreover, over the last five years 52% 
of the respondents fell victim to an attack (the 
proportion for 2012 was 36%). 
Fears associated with anti-Semitic attacks are 
causing an increasing number of Jews to con-
template leaving Germany. In 2018, 44% of 
the surveyed individuals considered emigrating 
(45% did not)5; in 2012, 25% of the respondents 
thought about emigrating (63% did not consid-
er leaving Germany); however, no data is availa-
ble as regards their actual departures. The fears 
are reflected in the everyday life of Jews in Ger-
many – 75% say they no longer wear religious 
symbols in public places and 46% avoid visiting 
districts and places considered potentially dan-
gerous6. This line of thinking is reinforced by 
5 ‘Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism – Sec-
ond survey on discrimination and hate crime against 
Jews in the EU’, December 2018, https://fra.europa.
eu /en /publ icat ion /2018 /2nd-sur vey-discr imina-
tion-hate-crime-against-jews
6 ‘Experiences and perceptions’, op. cit., ‘Diskriminierung 
und Hasskriminalität gegenüber Juden in den EU-Mit-
gliedstaaten’, November 2013, https://fra.europa.eu/
sites/default/files/fra-2013-discrimination-hate-crime-
against-jews-eu-member-states_de.pdf 
recommendations issued by representatives of 
Jewish communities, who call on Jews to avoid 
wearing a kippah in public places (Josef Schus-
ter, President of the Central Council of Jews in 
Germany) and visiting specific districts in cities 
due to their higher than average rate of anti-Se-
mitic crimes (such as Berlin or Frankfurt)7. 
An increase in the number of attacks
In 2017, anti-Semitic crimes accounted for 4% 
of all politically-motivated crimes8. In 2018, the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior recorded a 20% 
increase in the number of anti-Semitic attacks 
compared with 20179. Out of 1,799 crimes which 
the Interior Ministry categorised as anti-Semit-
ic in nature, more than 60 were incidents in-
volving the use of violence (representing a 67% 
rise in such attacks). Since 2001, when the new 
system of compiling statistics was introduced, 
the average number of crimes motivated by 
anti-Semitism has stood at 1,200–1,800 annu-
ally, including 28–64 crimes involving the use 
of violence annually10. Until recently, there has 
been a relationship between the number of 
crimes and the intensity of the Israeli-Palestini-
an conflict (an increase to 1,600–1,800 in 2002, 
2006, 2009 and 2014). However, the present 
7 “No-Go-Areas“ in der Stadt: Wo Kippa tragen als gefähr-
lich gilt, Frankfurter Neue Presse, 14 August 2018, https://
www.fnp.de/frankfurt/no-go-areas-stadt-kippa-tragen-
gefaehrlich-gilt-10368715.html and F. Hackenbruch, 
Für Juden ist jede Ecke Berlins potenziell gefähr-
lich, Der Tagesspiegel, 13 December 2018, https://
w w w.tages sp iege l .de /po l i t i k /ant i s emi t i smus - 
fuer-juden-ist-jede-ecke-berlins-potenziell-gefaehr-
lich/23743012.html 
8 Since 2017, the interior ministry has divided its statistics 
of crimes into new categories, among other reasons due 
to anti-Muslim motivation of crimes Cf. ‘Politisch Motiv-
ierte Kriminalität im Jahr 2017’, Ministry of the Interior, 
Construction and Heimat, https://www.bmi.bund.de/
SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/2018/
pmk-2017.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4
9 Politisch Motivierte Kriminalität im Jahr 2018, Federal 
Ministry of the Interior, Berlin, 14 May 2019, https://
www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/
DE/2019/05/pmk-2018.html
10 In 2001, the interior ministry changed the definition of 
politically-motivated crimes, which has made it possible 
to include a bigger number of anti-Semitic attacks in the 
statistics. 
In 1990–2017, 232,000 Jewish immigrants 
came to Germany (of the 250,000 Jewish 
people currently), many of whom joined 
Jewish communities.
OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 301 4
increase is not directly related to Israeli-Pales-
tinian tension, but is more a continuation of the 
trend recorded since 2012 (see Annex: chart 1). 
The increase in the number of attacks has also 
been sparked by verbal aggression in social 
media and in messages sent to institutions 
(e.g. e-mails), as well as by an increased number 
of rallies during which anti-Semitic sentiments 
were expressed. Schools are another forum for 
increasingly frequent attacks. Teachers point to 
the absence of suitable instruments for report-
ing instances of anti-Semitic behaviour, which 
is particularly frequent in children who come 
from a different culture, and to the absence 
of recommended procedures to be followed in 
such cases11.
Most often, anti-Semitic attacks take the form 
of incitement to violence, dissemination of 
propaganda materials and symbols of banned 
organisations, damage to property (includ-
ing cemeteries, synagogues and restaurants), 
physical assaults and arson. Nearly half of the 
crimes are committed on the Internet12. The 
events that caught the most media attention 
this year included a physical assault on a group 
of young people wearing kippahs in April 2018 
in Berlin. The event was filmed by the assault’s 
victims and the video was posted online13. The 
most advanced in-depth research focuses on 
those attacks occurring in Berlin, which has the 
11 E. Kagermeier, ‘Antisemitismus an Schulen: Schon wied-




12 ‘Ein Bericht der Recherche- und Informationsstelle Anti-
semitismus Berlin (RIAS)’, Berlin 2019.
13 Ibidem.
highest number of incidents among all German 
federal states and where the Jewish community 
is the country’s largest14. Most frequently, the 
attacks take place in the street, on public trans-
port, in schools and universities, at the victim’s 
workplace and in the vicinity of Holocaust com-
memoration sites. Institutions and non-gov-
ernmental organisations are more frequently 
targeted than private individuals. In 2018, 46 
attacks involving the use of violence were re-
corded in Berlin (the figure for 2017 was 18); 
the total number of victims was 86, includ-
ing 13 children and young adults. Men were 
more frequently targeted than women. In the 
case of 24 individuals their Jewish origin was 
emphasised and in the case of 43 others the 
motivation for the attack was that they were 
considered political opponents with excessively 
pro-Israeli views. 
The increase in anti-Semitic crimes on the In-
ternet is particularly evident. According to Ger-
man Jews, online anti-Semitism is the most se-
rious problem associated with anti-Semitism in 
Germany (87% of the respondents support this 
view)15. Social media sites provide considerable 
impetus to the organisational potential of an-
ti-Semitic groups and individuals by enabling 
them to disseminate content that was less read-
ily available before. In this way these individuals 
build their network of contacts, making it easier 
for them to find information on things such as 
anti-Semitic rallies. The Internet has also made 
it possible to engage in hate speech on an un-
precedented scale16. The increase in the number 
of anti-Semitic comments is of particular im-
portance, considering the fact that more than 
half of the crimes motivated by anti-Semitism 
14 Ibidem. 
15 A. Zick, A. Hövermann, S. Jensen, J. Bernstein, ‘Jüdische 
Perspektiven auf Antisemitismus in Deutschland’, April 
2017, https://uni-bielefeld.de/ikg/daten/JuPe_Bericht_
April2017.pdf 
16 Germany is trying to curb hate speech on the Inter-
net. Cf. K. Frymark, K. Popławski, ‘Germany: Combat-
ing disinformation and hate speech on the Internet’, 
OSW Analyses, 12 April 2017, https://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2017-04-12/germany-combat-
ing-disinformation-and-hate-speech-internet  
Fears associated with anti-Semitic 
attacks are causing an increasing num-
ber of Jews to consider leaving Germany. 
In 2018, 44% of the surveyed individuals 
considered emigrating.
OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 301 5
involve incitement to hatred and dissemina-
tion of propaganda materials and symbols of 
banned organisations. In 2007–2017, there was 
a surge in the number of anti-Semitic com-
ments on websites run by opinion-forming me-
dia outlets (including newspapers Die Welt, Die 
Zeit and FAZ) from 7% to 30%17. 
Imported anti-Semitism? 
The assessment of the relationship between 
migration to Germany and the increase in the 
number of anti-Semitic attacks is hindered by 
the absence of comprehensive research from 
all German federal states that takes into ac-
count the context of admitting refugees who 
came to Germany in the 2015 migration wave. 
One of the few studies focused on anti-Semit-
ic attitudes of individuals who came to Ger-
many after 2015 was compiled on the basis of 
research conducted in Bavaria on a group of 
Syrians, Iraqis and Afghans. The authors have 
identified more widespread anti-Semitic ten-
dencies in this group of respondents compared 
with the rest of society, although no direct cor-
relation of these tendencies to attacks motivat-
ed by anti-Semitism was found18. Experts from 
the federal Ministry of the Interior have arrived 
at similar conclusions – they found out that 
17 M. Schwarz-Friesel, ‘Langzeitstudie Antisemitismus 2.0 
und die Netzkultur des Hasses’, Technische Universität 
Berlin, July 2018, https://www.linguistik.tu-berlin.de/
menue/antisemitismus_2_0/ 
18 D. Poensgen, A. Rasumny, B. Steinitz, D. Streibl, Problem- 
beschreibung: Antisemitismus in Bayern, Recherche- 
und Informationsstelle Antisemitismus, August 2018. 
among refugees, anti-Semitic attitudes were 
reported by 56% of the respondents (whereas 
the average proportion for Germans is 16–20%). 
The interior ministry officials attribute the high-
est proportion (94% in 2017) of anti-Semitic 
crimes to right extremists. A mere 2% of the 
attacks were perpetrated by Muslims19. This is 
also confirmed by research conducted by the 
Berlin-based Technical University (Technische 
Universität, TU), in which attention was paid to 
the absence of any link between anti-Semitic 
attacks and the alleged involvement of asy-
lum seekers in them20. In their 2017 report, 
the experts appointed by the interior ministry 
presented significantly different figures. Their 
research findings compiled on the basis of sur-
veys conducted among Jews indicate that 80% 
of attacks involving the use of violence are per-
petrated by Muslims21. Moreover, German Jews 
most frequently point to Muslims as perpetra-
tors of anti-Semitic attacks (41%)22 among all 
Jews surveyed in EU states. Research conducted 
by the IKG with the participation of Jews living 
in Germany is also important. It showed that 
most frequently the respondents pointed to 
Muslims as perpetrators of harassment and in-
sulting behaviour (62%)23. 
The divergence between the small number of 
anti-Semitic crimes attributed to Muslims in 
the interior ministry’s statistics and the opin-
ions reported by Jews who have been targets 
of such attacks raises certain doubts as regards 
the methods for compiling these statistics and/
or the method for surveying the respondents. 
19 M. C. Schulte von Drach, ‘Wie verbreitet ist Antisemitis-




20 D. Feldman, Antisemitism and Immigration in Western 
Europe Today. Is there a connection? Berlin, April 2018.
21 ‘Antisemitismus in Deutschland – aktuelle Entwicklun-




22 ‘Experiences and perceptions’, op. cit. 
23 ‘Jüdische Perspektiven’, op. cit.
Schools are another forum for increasing-
ly frequent attacks. Teachers point to the 
absence of suitable means of reporting 
instances of anti-Semitic behaviour that 
is particularly frequent among children 
who come from a different culture.
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The fragmentary nature of the statistics 
The differences in the methods for compiling 
statistics adopted by the police have resulted 
in the number of reported attacks being under-
stated. This was the conclusion drawn by the ex-
pert group appointed by the interior ministry24. 
It has also been confirmed by the Berlin-based 
Centre for Research and Information on anti- 
-Semitism (RIAS). The Centre is considered by 
the German government’s plenipotentiary for 
the fight against anti-Semitism as a model 
example of how a non-governmental organ-
isation should compile its statistics. The Cen-
tre’s statistics indicate that in 2016 470 crimes 
inspired by anti-Semitism occurred in Berlin, 
whereas the federal state’s counterintelligence 
unit (LfV) registered 175 such crimes. Some of 
the differences in the statistics result from the 
fact that the RIAS includes both crimes and less 
serious incidents in its statistics. 
The main reasons behind the discrepancies 
in the statistics include the rule, which is also 
present in other legal systems, that in the case 
of crimes involving several punishable offenc-
es only the offence that is subject to the most 
severe penalty is taken into account (for exam-
ple, in the case of a robbery motivated by an-
ti-Semitism only the crime of robbery is taken 
into account). The statistics are also affected by 
the divergent number of events reported dur-
ing rallies. Commonly, only a portion of offenc-
es committed during rallies is registered by the 
police and included in the statistics. In addition, 
24 ‘Antisemitismus in Deutschland’, op. cit. 
the police do not always recognise the back-
ground of these crimes and categorise them 
as politically-motivated crimes perpetrated 
by right extremists, without pointing to anti- 
-Semitism as their motivation. Another prob-
lem lies in the internal categorisation of anti- 
-Semitic crimes, according to which whenever 
the crime is thought to have been committed 
by unknown perpetrators it is categorised as 
a manifestation of right extremism (based on 
the right extremists’ ideological affiliation to 
national socialism). The majority of such cases 
are crimes involving dissemination of propa-
ganda materials and symbols of organisations 
that have been considered unconstitutional. 
This constitutes the largest share of all such 
crimes (motivated by anti-Semitism), which re-
sults in a partial distortion of the statistics25. 
The ‘grey area’ of crimes based on anti-Semitism 
also includes those that remain unreported by 
the victims. According to research conducted 
by the FRA in 2012 and by the council of experts 
on anti-Semitism appointed by the interior min-
istry in 2016, a mere 28% and 23% of surveyed 
German Jews, respectively, admitted to having 
reported crimes they had been the target of to 
the police26. Moreover, law enforcement bodies 
tend to ignore some of the offenses, i.e. those 
that do not target specific individuals (for in-
stance, those involving the display of banned 
symbols). A mere 2% of the surveyed individu-
als admit that the investigation undertaken to 
prosecute the crime they had been the subject 
of was launched on the initiative of the police. 
The categorisation of crimes motivated by the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is another problem. 
These offenses are categorised, depending on 
the officer responsible for registering them, 
either as crimes motivated by anti-Semitism or 
as “intrastate conflicts” without any anti-Semitic 
aspect. 
25 S. Unsleber, ‘Verletzt in Berlin’, Die Tageszeitung, 
15 February  2018, https://taz.de/Antisemitismus-in- 
Deutschland/!5482392/ 
26 ‘Antisemitismus in Deutschland’, op. cit. 
Another problem lies in internal catego-
risation of anti-Semitic crimes, according 
to which whenever the crime is thought to 
have been committed by unknown perpe-
trators, it is categorised as a manifesta-
tion of right extremism.
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The political fight
The dispute over the attitudes among political 
parties towards anti-Semitism is a persistent as-
pect of Germany’s discourse and political con-
flict. In recent years, it has intensified due to an 
unprecedented number of anti-Semitic state-
ments by representatives of AfD, which, along-
side the Left Party, is most frequently accused 
by other parties of ignoring anti-Semitism in its 
own ranks. 
In both cases, anti-Semitism is condemned by 
the party leaders, even though it remains pres-
ent in statements by politicians from the parties’ 
radical factions. This is particularly true for the 
extreme wing of the AfD, known as Der Flügel 
(or ‘wing’ in German), which is monitored by 
counterintelligence. The most well-known inci-
dents were those involving Wolfgang Gedeon 
from the Landtag of Baden-Württemberg, who 
has referred to The Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion, for instance, and Björn Höcke, the head 
of the AfD parliamentary group in the Landtag 
of Thuringia, who described the Holocaust Me-
morial in Berlin as “a monument of shame”27. In 
most cases, the party’s executives offer an im-
mediate denunciation of these views, although 
such a stance is becoming ever more divergent 
from what ordinary party members think. The 
latter’s resistance towards the proposal to hold 
individuals accused of anti-Semitism accounta-
27 The interior ministry’s experts have also categorised as 
the most explicit anti-Semitic statements expressed by 
AfD members those made by: Peter Ziemann, Jan-Ul-
rich Weiß, Gunnar Baumgart. Cf. ‘Antisemitismus in 
Deutschland’, op. cit.
ble was evident when they refused to support 
the motion in the Landtag of Baden-Württem-
berg to expel Gedeon from the party ranks. 
In the procedure, which was launched by the 
present AfD chief, Jörg Meuthen, the required 
majority was two thirds of the votes cast by AfD 
parliamentary group members. This attempt to 
expel the politician has led to a rift in the local 
party structures.
In the Left Party, anti-Semitic statements are 
most often interpreted in the context of criti-
cism of Israel and of the USA. It is difficult to at-
tribute anti-Semitic tendencies to any particular 
party wing, but the most active representatives 
come from western German federal states. 
Members of the party’s structures there for-
merly belonged to Marxist and Maoist groups 
that fought against “Israel’s imperialism” and 
its cooperation with the USA. The Left Party 
was the only party to refuse (in January 2018) 
to support the Bundestag’s motion to condemn 
anti-Semitism and to appoint a governmental 
plenipotentiary for anti-Semitism. Just as for 
the AfD, the Left Party became excluded by the 
remaining parliamentary groups from work-
ing on the motion. Formerly, the party had 
been known for instances such as its criticism 
of the speech that Shimon Peres had given in 
the Bundestag to commemorate International 
Holocaust Remembrance Day (on 27 January 
2010) and for the participation of several of its 
deputies (Annette Groth, Norman Paech, Inge 
Hörger) in the voyage of the so-called Free-
dom Flotilla organised by pro-Palestinian activ-
ists, which came under attack from the Israeli 
Navy in May 2010. In November 2008, the CDU 
brought about the exclusion of the Left Party 
from the group of co-initiators of the Bunde-
stag’s declaration condemning anti-Semitism 
in Germany. The Left Party has instead adopt-
ed the same text in a separate declaration. 
At present, it is being criticised for its contin-
ued support for the Gilets Jaunes, the ‘yellow 
vests’ movement in France, in spite of reports 
suggesting that the French protesters were in-
volved in anti-Semitic incidents.
The dispute over the political parties’ at-
titude towards anti-Semitism is a per-
sistent element of Germany’s discourse 
and political battles. In recent years, it 
has intensified due to ever more frequent 
anti-Semitic statements by representa-
tives of the AfD.
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Despite the fact that anti-Semitic rhetoric is 
present in both parties, both the Left Party 
and the AfD emphasise that within their ranks 
there are groups that cooperate with Jews. 
In the case of the Left Party, this involves the 
Shalom task force (Bundesarbeitskreis Shalom), 
which has been a component of the party’s 
youth organisation (Linksjugend) since 2007. 
It tries to influence the intra-party debate on 
anti-Semitism, such as by organising confer-
ences and events, as well as by issuing leaflets. 
A slightly different role is played by the group 
known as Jews in the AfD (Juden in der AfD), 
which was established in October 2018 by 24 
party members. In its operation it focuses on 
prosecuting cases of anti-Semitism within the 
Muslim community and of left anti-Zionism28. 
The AfD is using anti-Semitic attacks perpetrat-
ed by Muslims to criticise Angela Merkel’s mi-
gration policy by suggesting that the Chancellor 
is responsible for the increase in anti-Semitism 
in Germany (this view was expressed by the 
party’s deputy chief, Georg Pazderski, for ex-
ample)29. 
28 ‘Grundsatzerklärung der Bundesvereinigung Juden in 
der Alternative für Deutschland’, https://www.j-afd.org/
grundsatzerklaerung 
29 G. Pazderski, ‘Muslime dürfen ihren Antisemitismus 




A blow to Germany’s image 
The public debate on anti-Semitic attacks has 
contributed to an acceleration of the Bunde-
stag’s work and of the German government’s 
actions to prevent anti-Semitism. On the ini-
tiative of the CDU, the CSU, the SPD, the FDP 
and the Greens, with the support of the AfD, 
in January 2018 the Bundestag passed a reso-
lution condemning anti-Israeli demonstrations, 
the burning of Israel’s flag and anti-Semitic 
attacks (including those perpetrated by asylum 
seekers). The parliamentary debate resulted in 
the appointment in May 2018, for the first time 
in Germany’s history, of a government pleni-
potentiary for the fight against anti-Semitism. 
Diplomat Felix Klein, who in the foreign 
ministry was responsible for contacts with 
Jewish organisations and the fight against 
anti-Semitism, was appointed to this function. 
One of his priority projects is to compile an 
atlas of German anti-Semitism in which both 
anti-Semitic crimes and other incidents will be 
mapped. The atlas is intended to help to verify 
the statistics compiled by the police and to fill 
the gap between understated official data and 
the figures presented by non-governmental 
organisations. In one of her speeches, on 9 
November 2018, Chancellor Angela Merkel 
also pointed to the increase in anti-Semitism 
and the emergence in new guises (for exam-
ple, she mentioned anti-Semitism among Mus-
lims living in Germany) and announced a plan 
to implement a stricter policy to combat it. In 
a bid to improve its image, in 2018 the German 
government launched a debate on anti-Semitic 
attacks for the first time in the history of Ger-
man-Israeli intergovernmental consultations. 
Furthermore, at the EU level Germany will at-
tempt to emphasise its own initiatives focused 
on combatting anti-Semitism. This will be one 
of the priorities of Germany’s EU presidency in 
the second half of 2020. 
The increase in the number of anti-Semitic 
attacks is a blot on Germany’s image as 
a state that effectively combats any 
signs of anti-Semitism. This is particu-
larly important for Germans due to his-
torical reasons and a prevailing opinion 
within German society that the country 
has come to terms with its Nazi past in 
an exemplary manner.
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The increase in the number of anti-Semitic at-
tacks is a blot on Germany’s image as a state 
that effectively combats any signs of anti-Semi-
tism. This is particularly important for Germans 
due to historical reasons and a widespread 
opinion within German society that the coun-
try has come to terms with its Nazi past in an 
exemplary manner. Some politicians, such as 
the interior minister, Thomas de Maizière, treat 
the fight against anti-Semitism as Germany’s 
raison d’être and a litmus paper for German 
society. Similar views were expressed by Ger-
many’s President, Frank-Walter Steinmeier. The 
problem is all the more serious because 40% 
of young Germans aged 18–3430 have either 
30 The word Jew was not a common insult when I went 






never heard of the Holocaust or know “little to 
nothing” about it. Young people are also more 
prone to be critical of Israel. The new genera-
tion of pupils, who increasingly have a migrant 
background, is much more detached from Ger-
many’s Nazi past, and school text books from 
which they learn frequently discuss the issues 
related to anti-Semitism in a superficial or in-
complete manner31. This poses new challenges 
for Germany, including the need to combine 
the country’s asylum policy and the intention 
to take in new migrants with the need to main-
tain the present special status of its relations 
with Israel.
31 S. Salzborn, A. Kurth, Antisemitismus in der Schule, 
Erkenntnisstand und Handlungsperspektiven. Wissen-
schaftliches Gutachten, January 2019.
ANNEX
Actions carried out by the state to curb anti-Semitism
The increase in the number of anti-Semitic attacks has inspired the German state to launch preven-
tive measures. This mainly concerns three areas: genuine prevention (including training sessions for 
teachers, police officers, judges and representatives of other professions), the system for monitor-
ing how attacks are reported (including the proposed creation in all federal states of special units 
monitoring the attacks, modelled on the Berlin-based RIAS) and increased coordination of actions 
both in specific federal states and at the level of cooperation between the central government and 
individual federal states (attempts to appoint plenipotentiaries for combatting anti-Semitism in all 
federal states). 
Due to the federal structure of the German state, mainly bodies operating at the federal state level 
are involved in preventing anti-Semitic attacks. These bodies include the great majority of institu-
tions responsible for these tasks, i.e. the federal state police (protection of places of worship, schools 
and selected restaurants), federal state counterintelligence structures (LfV), educational institutions 
(including workshops organised under decentralised subsidy programmes focusing on both preven-
tion and response to anti-Semitic attacks in schools) and federal state centres for political education 
(Landeszentrale für politische Bildung supervised by the ministry of the interior). 
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At the federation level, institutions responsible for the fight against anti-Semitism include ministries 
(the interior ministry in particular, as well as the ministry for family, senior citizens, women and 
youth) and central-level offices such as the counterintelligence office (BfV). The government’s pleni-
potentiary for the fight against anti-Semitism and a joint committee made up of representatives ap-
pointed by federal states and by the central government are responsible for coordination of actions 
carried out jointly by specific federal states and at the federation level. In addition, eight federal 
states have appointed their regional plenipotentiaries for the fight against anti-Semitism.
Chart 1. Anti-Semitic attacks in Germany in 2002–2017







































Chart 2. Attacks on synagogues in 2008–2014

















Source: Federal Ministry of the Interior
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Chart 3. Politically-motivated crimes with an anti-Semitic aspect in 2001–2015
Total number of anti-Semitic crimes committed by:
Anti-Semitic crimes involving the use of violence committed by:
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51
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